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SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
The Missing Link?  
Police and Statebuilding in South Arabia 
 
Dr James Worrall 
School of Politics & International Studies 
University of Leeds  
 
 
The failure of the statebuilding project, the insurgency and to use the famous phrase 
Britain's 'scuttle', or ignominious withdrawal, from South Arabia have long been the 
subject of study, receiving attention from many angles and new perspectives. One 
aspect which has received less attention is the role of policing in the statebuilding 
project of the Federation of South Arabia (FSA). This article sets out to explore this 
lacuna by contextualising the role of policing in statebuilding and examining the 
impact of its absence in the case of South Arabia. It is clear that Britain left it very late 
to attempt the construction of a Federal State in the face of mounting pressures and 
challenges, and even later to establish a proper Federal Police Service, the article 
thus examines the argument that the lack of developed policing structures was the 
missing link in the statebuilding process, before asking if Britain simply left the 
construction of effective and unified policing structures too late, or whether this was 
simply an impossible task.  
 
It is seemingly now widely recognised that the success of statebuilding is closely tied 
WR WKH VWDWH¶V FRHUFLYH FDSDELOLWLHV DQG LW LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ FOHDU WKDW WKH UROH RI WKH
police in this process is vital. One need only look at the exponential increase in the 
numbers of police attached to UN Peacekeeping and Reconstruction Missions which 
rose from 1,677 in 1994 to 17,500 in 2010 to see the increased emphasis placed on 
the police.1 This is also mirrored in developments in Afghanistan where, as of late 
WKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\¶VWURRSVDUHFRPSOHPHQWHGE\DQ$IJKDQ
National Police force of 148,500 - based on numbers alone at least it seems police 
matter.2 
 
In the case of the formation of the Federation of South Arabia however, there was 
little emphasis placed upon the role and utility of the police. This is perhaps natural 
given the nature of the threats facing the Federation both internally and externally 
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but this poses significant questions. Across the protectorate states of South Arabia 
and in Aden Colony there were a multiplicity of policing structures, most of which 
were small, ineffective and under resourced, having developed in an ad hoc fashion, 
and feeling very much like an afterthought in policy terms. The extent to which this 
mosaic of policing structures hindered rather than helped the process of state 
creation in the Federation of South Arabia is an important and neglected issue both 
for South Arabia and for more recent attempts at statebuilding. Understanding 
whether the fragmented policing that emerged across South Arabia was the usual 
benign neglect in which the police inevitably come a distant second to the army, or a 
deliberate policy, driven, in whole or in part, by the demands of local tribal politics, 
primarily because the Federal rulers remained suspicious of centralised authority 
exercised from Aden, is, in turn, crucial to understanding how a lack of credible 
internal security in the FSA led to its downfall. Exploring the politics of policymaking 
in the area of policing in South Arabia can, in itself, act as a mirror to the continuing 
necessity of effective policing for both state legitimacy and a sense of national 
identity. Thus this article engages with the role of policing in statebuilding and 
explores why it was so neglected in the case of the FSA, with the aim of examining 
the question of what a Federation-wide police force could have offered to the new 
state both before and after the merging of the Federal National Guard and the 
Federal Regular Army in mid-1967, on the eve of South Yemen's rushed 
independence.  
 
In this sense, the article has a clear element of the counterfactual about it. However, 
rather than simply taking a traditional counterfactual approach, imagining how a well-
established, nationwide police force might have come about if policymaking had 
been handled differently, and what difference this might have made to the survival of 
the newly unified state, the article instead uses a mix of historical and security 
studies methods to explore the role and importance of the police in statebuilding 
processes, in order to assess the state of policing in Aden and the protectorates from 
WKHVDQGH[SORUHWKHUHDVRQVIRU%ULWDLQ¶VQHJOHFWRI these functions and their 
impact upon the longevity of the newly constituted state. It is interesting to note here 
that after the collapse of the Federation upon its independence in November 1967 
and the brief but bloody civil war between the Front for the Liberation of Occupied 
South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF), the new Marxist 
state which emerged was able to ruthlessly suppress dissent and had police which 
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were very much in place to protect the state and the system of government, perhaps 
benefitting from the new regime's links with the population and its recognition of how 
information and infiltration led to NLF success meant it was more assiduous in 
maintaining these advantages and readily recognised the importance of policing.3 
 
In order to engage with these issues the article begins by taking a closer look at how 
EHVW WR FRQFHSWXDOLVH WKH VHFXULW\ HQYLURQPHQW DQG WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG SROLFH¶V
role within this sphere. By applying the concept of the security arena it is easier to 
see the challenge facing a weak government. Next the role of police in statebuilding 
more generally is discussed, in order to develop some key principles which can then 
be compared to the particular case of the FSA; here a brief overview of the obstacles 
facing the statebuilding process in South Arabia are introduced. With this theoretical 
and historical background in place the article then turns to an examination of the 
evolution of policing structures in the FSA and British policymaking and thinking 
about policing during the 1950s and 1960s. While there were a range of civil police 
and armed constabularies across South Arabia, as well as the Aden Police itself, the 
half-hearted and last minute attempt at creating a coherent unified police force with a 
clear remit in June 1967 left the new force with no time to establish itself.4 This looks 
very much like a policy failure with concomitant questions arising of why this 
happened and what the chances were for the establishment of an efficient and 
effective nationwide policing structure, which in turn enable conclusions to be drawn 
DQG WKHDUWLFOH¶VNH\TXHVWLRQ WREHHQJDJHG7KXV WKURXJKDQH[SORUDWLRQRIZK\
policing was sidelined for so long in South Arabia and an examination of what a 
police force offers to the process of state formation we can engage with the question: 
was the absence of a national police force the missing link in the process of state 
creation in South Arabia? 
 
The State±Based Security Arena 
 
A useful framework with which to begin thinking about the nature of policing for 
statebuilding can be developed through an understanding of the way in which 
security is constructed and maintained. This also necessitates recognition that the 
role of the police in this process is different, but complementary to, the role of the 
armed forces more generally. In recent decades much effort has gone into trying to 
understand the nature of what has come to be called the security sector and the 
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reforms needed to make it more cohesive, efficient and representative. One of the 
biggest issues with this approach is that it is based on an ideal type of political 
structure in which the nation-state maintains a centralised control of the security 
structures which are tasked with delivering security both for the state (from its 
internal and external foes) but also for the state's citizens (from crime, disorder and 
other threats to their rights, property and families). This vision of the state holding the 
Weberian monopoly of the use of violence through control of centralised security 
structures was of course the natural model that Western colonial powers would 
generally wish to export as the ideal type but this ignores two key factors: firstly that 
this approach was ever really fully applied by Britain in South Arabia outside of the 
Crown Colony of Aden until the very last years of its presence there, and secondly 
that the image of a unified, coherent security sector is a useful prism through which 
to view the provision of security in South Arabia anyway.  
 
The recognition of these facts is useful because it enables us to search for other 
prisms through which to view the security situation in South Arabia as Britain 
commenced the process of creating the Federation of South Arabia in earnest from 
the 1950s onwards. The section below gives an overview of the contours of this 
process, here it is important to introduce an alternative conceptualisation of the 
security field which can be used to view Britain's attempts to create the basic 
elements of a unified state from a disparate mass of feudal rulers, which might 
(hopefully) have the coercive capacity needed to give it the opportunity to build itself 
up into something more closely resembling the Weberian ideal type in the longer run, 
for this in reality was probably the best that could be hoped for in the circumstances. 
 
The important thing to realise is that despite the British presence in Aden and its 
attempts to engage in 'aerial policing'5 of restive tribes further away from the strategic 
port, Britain's presence in these areas was always sparse and fleeting. Each ruler 
was long responsible for maintaining order within his domains and it was not until the 
1950s that more centralised forms were really instituted. Even those security forces 
which were developed to enable the rulers some semblance of control of their fiefs 
tended to be small in number and capacity, and in addition there were often 
numerous security forces operating under the control of each ruler, often alongside 
other informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and the maintenance of order in 
isolated communities. This meant that while the British often appeared to consider 
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the project of creating security structures for the new state more in the vein of 
modern-day security sector reform, what they really faced was a situation in which 
security was a product provided by multiple suppliers and the field in which this 
provision took place was therefore not a definable sector of the state but instead an 
arena of competition and co-operation which was constantly shifting and changing, 
and importantly was one in which, when the suppliers of security were identified, the 
state itself may or may not have primacy in the field. This security arena in which 
sub-state security is played out 'alludes to the personalized or neopatrimonial 
relationships and inter-agency rivalries conducted amongst and between political 
elites and security actors such as police, militaries, intelligence agencies, special 
units, warlords, militia and commercial security companies'.6 What Britain faced from 
the 1950s was a patchwork quilt even of different formal security bodies with 
different aims and objectives, controlled by different rulers; in addition to locally 
privatised forms of security, soft security functions which were largely hidden from its 
view and frequently even from the rulers themselves - often exercised by cultural and 
spiritual leaders - and a society suffused with weapons in which the exercise of 
authority was often more of a negotiation than a right. Added to this were inter and 
intra tribal squabbles, insurgent movements with both Nasserite and Communist 
leanings (and concomitant external support) and a lack of time and resources with 
which to address these issues.  
 
The utility of the concept of the security arena is that it explicitly forces us to confront 
the absence of many of the conditions in which, we take for granted, a security 
sector will be operating. Realising that the state's security structures are not 
dominant and may not even be considered primus inter pares is an important step 
and enables us to explore how best to develop the state's coercive capacities to 
enable it to at least reach the latter position and develop from there. This may also 
be an important clue in explaining why the Federal Army received so much attention 
while policing received so little when the time came for Britain to try to put the 
security forces of the FSA on a more sustainable footing. Having a robust army 
which can dominate all other contestants within the security arena gives the state a 
dominant position in negotiations over issues of security and offers it protection from 
forces which wish to either take over the state or to see its collapse because it is a 
challenge to existing power structures. At this juncture one may well ask what utility 
can be ascribed to policing if a strong and capable federal armed forces can give the 
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state a predominant position in the security arena with which to engage with other 
security providers and societal actors.  
 
Policing 
 
Policing is often the Cinderella service when it comes to more recent post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts, security sector reform and even when upholding colonial 
power. Time and time again policing appears to be an afterthought rather than being 
seen as critical to stability and order in any Weberian-style nation-building project. 
Instead, it is the military which receives the lion's share of attention and resources. In 
the absence or weakness of policing structures, it is the military which is, in turn, 
forced into supporting an inadequate police service or ends up becoming a 
repressive instrument used for police work but without the training or temperament to 
perform these duties adequately, often with disastrous political and humanitarian 
results. An added problem when it comes to police forces in much of the developing 
world is the question of policing priorities, protecting the state or protecting the 
population, far too often the police themselves are used as a repressive instrument 
of the state. Rather than a complement to the role of the military in the Weberian 
ideal, they are merely an adjunct force. It is of course important to bear in mind that 
methods of policing differ and may not always match with the aims and expectations 
of various audiences both within, and withRXW WKHVWDWH'HVSLWH WKLVDFOHDU µLGHDO
W\SH¶ KDV HPHUJHG WKDW KDV DWWUDFWHG DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQVHQVXV DQG WKLV W\SH LV
rooted in a British approach which was gradually moving from the British mainland 
into the colonies from the 1950s onwards.7 
 
The ideal type of policing for much of the liberal-democratic world is clearly one in 
which the dichotomy between these two roles, of protecting the state and the public, 
is bridged through good relationships, trust and responsiveness. Even many less-
democratic regimes have learnt that the use of the police as a repressive tool of 
state power is no guarantee of regime survival. Instead, the police must be used as 
more than just a blunt instrument and it is perhaps in this manner that they are best 
able to complement the power of the regular armed forces. As David Bayley points 
out, 'capturing, killing or imprisoning people who commit violent acts does not 
mitigate insecurity in the long term unless the identification of perpetrators or targets 
is guided by precise intelligence'.8 This is down to the need to be seen to be 
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proportionate and to give the impression of omnipotence. It is clear that the police 
can only be of a limited efficacy acting on their own, because 'the great effectiveness 
multiplier in the use of state power against violence is the allegiance and support of 
the public'9 and in order to gain this support 'responsibility for security should be 
entrusted as far as possible to police deployed among the population who minimise 
the use of force and who act in accordance with local norms'.10 Whether the 
implementation of this ideal type was ever entirely possible in South Arabia is a moot 
point since it is clear that there was a desire to aim for this kind of policing among 
policymakers, as plans for a single union-wide police force, the South Arabian 
Police, were developed during the 1960s. More importantly for us, is to recognise the 
importance that is placed on the police in the academic literature on the statebuilding 
process and that the skills they offer to the state are an essential counterpart to 
those of the armed forces within the security arena. In the end, the brute power of 
the armed forces can deter and contain, while giving the state time to use its position 
of power preponderance in the security arena to reach political compromises with 
other actors in this arena wherever possible. The police on the other hand are more 
day-to-GD\VHFXULW\DFWRUVVLQFH LQ%ULWDLQ¶VYLVLRQRIKRZ WKHZRUOGVKRXOGEH WKH
military is a last resort when the situation has escalated and a direct threat to the 
VWDWH¶VVHFXULW\KDVHPHUJHGDQGFDQQRWEHKDQGOHGLQDQ\RWKHUZD\7KHSROLFHDFW
as a buffer between the armed forces and the population; they are designed to build 
networks, prevent escalation, communicate information between the population and 
the state (and vice versa), and, as importantly, to serve and protect the public. In this 
sense then, they are the public face of the state and have a vital role to play in 
upholding order and providing security, which as the foundational benefit of having a 
state for the population, goes a long way to securing the legitimacy of the state itself, 
whilst also assisting in the creation of a common national identity. 
 
It is perhaps natural to see what happened in South Arabia, with the effective 
collapse of policing and the failure to create a nationwide police force in the form of 
the South Arabian Police until the very last moment of British rule, and dismiss the 
chances of the police making any difference at all. Yet clearly Britain was successful 
in creating police forces elsewhere in the colonies which played a significant role in 
the statebuilding process. Closer to Aden there is also the example of the efficacy of 
Policing in South Arabia in the form of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion (HBL)11 in the 
Eastern Protectorates, granted there are differences between the two areas but it is 
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clear that the HBL had a significant role in bringing order to the region and enabled it 
to remain stable for longer. Established in 1938 after the 'Ingrams' Peace'12 was 
secured, 'the British-officered Hadhrami Bedouin Legion was formed along the lines 
of Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion in Transjordan and given the task of providing security 
in the Protectorate. With modifications this security system was still in place when 
the National Liberation Front took over from the British in 1967.¶13 What is especially 
interesting about this force is that it behaved more like a police force than an army. 
Its job was to build relationships, trust and legitimacy; importantly beginning its work 
in 1938, this gave it the time to embed itself. As Doreen Ingrams puts it when talking 
of the region's development: 'none of this could have happened if there had not been 
peace, and peace would not have been maintained without the formation of the 
Hadhrami Bedouin Legion'. The force, established by Harold Ingrams, brought 
together tribesmen 'from different tribes to serve in policing the country, in spreading 
education, in giving medical help, arbitrating, and developing a sense of trust 
between the various sections of the community...[there was a process of] learning to 
accept erstwhile enemies as friends and appreciating the benefits of order and 
justice'.14 Not only was the force able to end tribal warfare and raiding, thus enabling 
trade and development but its multifaceted role and the respect it earned led to the 
tribes' increasing trust of the government and appreciation of the benefits it brought. 
In this sense then it was a classic example of the role that unified, well directed 
policing can play in statebuilding projects - in stark contrast to the example in the 
Western Protectorates. 
 
Statebuilding in South Arabia 
 
It is important to bear in mind something of the context in which Britain was 
attempting to make the new Federation of South Arabia cohere and create the 
structures of a new state from the 1950s onwards, and especially in the run-up to 
withdrawal in 1967. The four key obstacles can be classified roughly as internal 
politics, regional politics, internal dissent and economic and political constraints. 
There is, naturally enough, a degree of interconnectivity between these factors and 
together they have consistently been used in the literature on South Yemen and the 
Federation to explain why London's statebuilding attempts appeared to fall on such 
barren ground.  
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The literature on Britain's policy in South Arabia and the collapse of the Federation is 
well established with clear dividing lines on the most important factors, from 
Nasserite subversion, to squabbling local rulers and Britain's loss of will. It is not 
necessary to review this literature extensively here. Instead, it is important to 
highlight the general lack of attention that the role of the police has received in these 
academic debates15 and to highlight how the lack of attention paid by +HU0DMHVW\¶V
Government (HMG) itself to policing is mirrored by the focus placed on the new 
Federal Army on the one hand and on the wider political difficulties in the 
statebuilding project on the other. It is evident that the piecemeal nature of the 
process of forming the Federation was a significant factor but there is a further issue 
in that the literature divides over either particular focus on the insurgency, or 
particular focus on the wider politics. It is evident from the literature that common 
factors are often highlighted and it is merely the degree of emphasis which is given 
that is the key factor. Clearly, poor co-ordination of intelligence activities was a key 
problem and is something in which policing plays a real role but it is also possible to 
point to the piecemeal nature of the creation of the Federation with different rulers 
showing varying levels of interest, the lack of any internal hegemon (as with Abu 
Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) to drive the process and impose itself, the 
lack of any sense of national unity and the lack of effective bureaucratic structures at 
Federal level can all further be pointed to, in addition to the four themes highlighted 
above, all of which also hindered the role of the police.   
 
Usually, mention of the police in the academic literature is made only in connection 
to the difficulties faced by the Aden Police or in mentioning the mutiny of the South 
Arabian Police in 1967. The police are already seen in the literature as a dead letter. 
Thus as Ian Beckett puts it: 
 
Aden was a failure for the British but largely as a result of the premature 
announcement by the Labour government in 1966 of its intention to leave 
South Arabia, undermining at a stroke the authorities of the Federation of 
South Arabia and the whole counterinsurgency effort. Increasingly, indeed, 
federal officials and even local governments in the emirates, sultanates, and 
sheikhdoms either left the country altogether or threw in their lot with the 
insurgent movements. In any case, intelligence had never been forthcoming 
freely from the population, and there was now little incentive to cooperate. 
Arab members of the Special Branch already had been targeted by the 
insurgents, and the local police forces were thoroughly infiltrated, both the 
South Arabian Police and Aden Armed Police.16 
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This quote highlights a number of key themes which crop up repeatedly in the 
literature, namely lack of British staying power, unreliability of allies and the 
successful decapitation of intelligence and policing by the insurgents. In this sense, 
the police are given a reverse importance in that by being targeted and infiltrated 
they become useless, thus contributing to defeat but they are not discussed in terms 
of what led to their being targeted or what contributed to the infiltration which 
rendered them ineffective in the first place. No emphasis is placed on Britain's 
failures to build up the police over a longer period and to give them the support 
needed to be able to become an effective tool of the state.  
  
There is a strong suggestion in much of the literature that the insurgency was 
irresistible and that it was inevitable that the armed forces and police would be 
compromised. This is put forward especially by R.J. Gavin.17 On the other side the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) scholar Thomas Mockaitis believes that Britain was 
unable to defeat the insurgents because of their own actions (and as importantly 
inaction).18 This is the starting point of this article. Jacob Abadi agrees, stating that, 
'local resistance to British rule in South Arabia was not sufficient to bring an end to 
British rule'; he instead ascribes the failure of the new state to 'Britain's failure to 
create a new collaborative local elite which could have replaced the old one', 
increasing costs of occupation exacerbated by foreign intervention in South Arabia 
and the wider moves to rearrange defence 'East of Suez'.19 Here the broader 
changes contributing to problems with the statebuilding project in terms of funding 
and local political direction come to the fore and were only exacerbated by the 
insurgency.  
 
Policing During a Counterinsurgency 
 
While during the 1950s the problems faced by Britain in South Arabia were centred 
around trade union militancy, low level sabotage and subversive acts, alongside 
political intransigence amongst the rulers, by the 1960s the situation was rapidly 
spiralling into a full-blown insurgency. The absence of strong and coherent policing 
in this phase is arguably of critical importance because it provides opportunities to 
disrupt and deter escalation, thus it is in these early stages when the police rather 
than the army can be most effective in preventing a descent into greater, more 
sustained and threatening forms of violence. Granted, for Britain, many of these 
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issues were centred on Aden which did have a police force but beyond the colony 
there were no policing structures under British control, thus, as the situation got out 
of hand there was little choice but to escalate rapidly into full-scale military 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 
Even after the outbreak of significant levels of organised political violence in the early 
1960s the continuing absence of an organised nationwide police force continued to 
be a major handicap sincHDV%D\OH\DQG3HULWRSXWLWµWKHFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJH
of the police vis-à-vis the military is not to become "little soldiers", doing proactive 
counter-insurgency. Instead, their comparative advantage is to respond to the 
security needs of individuals, thus contributing to the legitimacy of struggling local 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶;20 this connection with the population is crucial for good 
counterinsurgency and provides much needed intelligence. In Aden and the 
protectorates it was this absence of legitimacy and intelligence which was to prove 
fatal to the health of the newly inaugurated federation. The seeming absence of the 
idea of police primacy which was supposedly a hallmark of British counterinsurgency 
was perhaps more a recognition of the inability of the police forces to play this role 
given their size, capabilities and Balkanisation.  
 
The Evolution of Policing Structures in the FSA 
 
During Britain's long association with South Arabia responsibility for policing duties 
was largely left to local Sheikhs, while in Aden a police force was not properly 
formed until the 1920s.21 As plans were made to gradually bring together the British 
protected Sheikhdoms of South Arabia into more cohesive administrative units the 
pattern of benign neglect of the police seemingly continued, with attention falling on 
the armed forces rather than formal policing structures right up to the formation of 
the Federation of South Arabia and independence in 1967. The Geraghty22 and 
Penfold-Young23 reports of the mid-1960s both recommended the creation of a 
Federal Police Force, the reinforcement of existing policing structures and better 
coordination between existing police-like units and the Aden Police. However in 
comparison to other security priorities, and particularly the Federal Regular Army 
there was little real emphasis placed upon the role and utility of the police, and even 
less resource available. This was perhaps natural given the nature of the threats 
facing the Federation both internally and externally but poses two significant 
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questions: firstly, what was the role and capability of police forces in South Arabia 
and secondly, what was Britain's policy towards policing in Aden and the 
protectorates and how and why did it evolve over time? The answers to these 
questions are somewhat depressing in that the role gradually blurred with that of the 
armed forces, capabilities remained inadequate24 and evolution was glacial and then 
far too rapid from the end of 1965. 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest problems in terms of the policing of South Arabia was 
the multiplicity of police forces which existed across the nation. Since the focus of 
the article is on the role of police in statebuilding in South Arabia and Britain's 
inability to create a union-wide police force which had the necessary capacity to fulfil 
its remit, it is only necessary here to give a flavour of the diversity of police and 
internal security forces across the territory. As Jill Crystal states in the context of the 
development of policing structures in Kuwait, a state which had a single unified force 
IURP WKH RXWVHW µWR PDLQWDLQ FRQWLQXRXV RUGHU UHTXLUHV WKH HQHUJ\ RI WKH ZKROH
VWDWH¶.25 In South Arabia the diversity of police and the lack of a nationwide force 
mitigated against even the energy of the whole of the police being directed at 
maintaining order; this was further exacerbated by the increasing disconnect 
EHWZHHQ WKHSROLFH¶V MRERISURPRWLQJDQGPDLQWDLQLQJ µJHQHUDORUGHU¶DQGSROLFLQJ
dissent against the state, as well as the fact that general order itself needs to be 
created and structured through consistent effort in the statebuilding process, which in 
this instance appeared to be more set on undermining order than in nurturing it. Thus 
to give some idea of the numbers of different police and security units, there were: 
the Aden Armed Police, Aden Civil Police, Federal National Guard (FNG), 
Government Guards, Tribal Guards, Lahej Police, Mahra Tribal Guard; and just in 
RQH6XOWDQDWHWKH4X¶DLWL$UPed Constabulary (plus Civil Police, the Prison Guards, 
the Customs Police, and the irregular non-uniformed Desert Guards).26  
 
The quality of these units naturally varied wildly to begin with and gradually grew 
worse as events ran their course, thus as D.J. McCarthy of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) who was working for the High Commissioner in Aden 
noted in 1965, 'the British machine as distinct from Arabised British, is ramshackle 
and running down and lacks most elements of normal infrastructure (i.e. career 
subordinate staff, automatic distributions, coherent command structure etc.). The 
successor Arab administrative machine barely exists yet.'27 To make things worse 
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police loyalties were also 'deeply divided'28 and this further complicated their role in 
providing reliable intelligence. It was in this environment that the creation of a 
Federal Police Force was finally begun. 
 
The Creation of the South Arabian Police 
 
The need for a Federal Police Service was not really widely recognised amongst 
officials until the early 1960s but perhaps more important than the absence of this 
force was the weakness of policing structures in general and the unwillingness to 
build up police capacity and resources more generally.29 This can be seen in the 
archival documents in the early and mid 1950s where discussions were taking place 
about the expansion of Aden's two police forces; expansion that was only envisaged 
in the low dozens of officers.30 Even as the insurgency was growing rapidly in the 
early 1960s there was much ink spilled over the addition of a further four Special 
Branch Officers for Aden.31 More ambitious expansion plans outlined in the Morris 
Report submitted to London in December 1961 rapidly got bogged down in Treasury 
objections to the cost.32 The report envisaged a rolling programme of police 
expansion between 1963 and 1966. Police housing had long been an issue and the 
colonial divides between the quality of housing for the local and expatriate officers 
were stark, Morris recommended the construction of some 500 new police houses. 
In fact, the whole plan was eventually rejected as being too ambitious and costly. It 
was also overambitious in terms of capacity - 'The Director of Federal Works made it 
quite clear that even if he had the money, there was no capacity to build houses on 
the scale recommended by Morris'.33 
 
As the situation deteriorated in South Arabia during the 1960s HMG commissioned 
in-depth reports examining various aspects of the Federation, the two most 
significant of which are the Geraghty Report and the Penfold-Young Report. The 
latter dealing with 'the situation' proposed the re-equipment and expansion of the 
Federal Force and expansion of the Hadrami Bedouin Legion and of other Eastern 
protectorate police. The expansions34 agreed by HMG in the wake of the report 
consisted of a tiered level of priorities and included in level one, expansion of forces 
and new weapons for the army and an additional platoon for the HBL, in level two 
further support for the army and on the police side an additional company for the 
HBL, a riot squad for Mukalla Police, and an expansion of the Kathiri Armed 
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Constabulary. The letter outlining these modest police expansions stated: 'We 
should explain that compelling need to limit Government expenditure in present 
financial difficulties of U.K, obliges us to restrict consideration to proposals that are 
absolutely vital to maintain the security of the Federation and other States.'35 The 
report meanwhile stated that the role of the Federal Regular Army (FRA) should be 
'the maintenance of internal security and tribal law and order in support of the 
Federal Guard'; it also recommended the eventual formation of 'c. A Federal Mobile 
Armed Police [and] d. A static Federal Police Force¶.36  
 
The Geraghty Report had a narrower remit, exploring 'The Administrative Problems 
of the F.R.A and the Federal Guard'. This report also ended up recommending 
reorganisation and commented on the need for police.37 At this stage J.P. Morton 
noted that on his reading of the report his proposals were threefold and he hoped Sir 
Ivor Stourton would champion them. The first was '[t]here should be a Federal Police 
Force... The components of the Federal Police would be the local or State Police 
forces... these forces would retain certain local responsibilities to their Rulers or 
Governments for the maintenance of law and order; but in regard to certain central 
subjects they would be liable to central direction and control¶. Second, he believed 
that, 'there should be a Federal Special Branch built into the Federal Police', and 
third, that this should come under the direction of the Federal Intelligence 
Committee.38 These ideas then had to work their way through the system. What 
eventually emerged was the decision to establish the South Arabian Police from a 
merger of part of the FNG 2 (units which operated within the borders of individual 
states), the Aden Civil Police and the Aden Armed Police, the latter consisting of just 
350 men. Worse still, in April 1967, 40 per cent of the rank and file of the FNG had 
no uniform, and unlike the new army reorganisation 'the police amalgamation never 
really materialised [meaning] the combined South Arabian Police force existed in 
name only'.39 
 
The Police, The Army and the 1967 Dual Mutiny 
 
The new force lacked manpower, facilities, and presence across all the states, as 
well as clear command structures. In addition to the confusion of police forces, with 
different make-ups, responsibilities, duties and lines of command, there were also 
tensions between the army and the police. Indeed, both forces were disrupted by the 
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process of attempting to absorb the disparate security forces of the protectorates 
and Aden. It is regrettable to have difficulties with the police but to have the army 
disrupted at the same time spells suicide for any state attempting to secure its place 
in the security arena just as the colonial power is heading for the exit.40 In this case 
the new South Arabian Army (SAA) which had received the lion's share of British 
attention and limited resources was also destabilised by its merger with elements of 
the Federal National Guard, all of which was further exacerbated by personality 
clashes. 
 
The political situation at the time, the penetration of the army and the new South 
Arabian Police by the opposition and declining British power combined to bring about 
the mutiny of both the army and the newly constituted South Arabian Police, along 
with the Aden Armed Police. On the morning of 20 June 1967 units mutinied over a 
complex mixture of rumour, suspicion and frustration connected with hostility towards 
Britain over its suspected support of Israel in the six-day war, as well as the 
controversial suspension of three Arab Colonels. The disturbances led to the deaths 
of 22 British troops in a series of engagements throughout that day, which quickly 
turned into inter-tribal and politically inspired violence between supporters of FLOSY 
and the NLF in which the Crater District of Aden was completely taken over by 
insurgents and not recaptured until 3 July.41 
 
The mutiny is seen by many as the ultimate failure of the statebuilding project in 
South Arabia. It is perhaps ironic that the police were so well represented in the 
symbolic end of the Federation, given the lack of attention given to the importance of 
policing for so long. It is not just that the police were an afterthought, receiving little 
attention and resources when compared to the army but that by the time policing 
began to be recognised it was simply too late for it to be a successful measure in 
shoring up the Federation and advancing the statebuilding process. Events had 
moved on too quickly and it was both the lack of a nationwide police, the hollowing 
out of the effectiveness of the existing police forces and the wider decline in the 
prospects of the statebuilding project which combined to mean that the new South 
Arabian Police would face an impossible task and were already a dead letter before 
they were officially formed.42   
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Fragmentation, Entrepreneurialism, Self Interest and the Role of the Rulers 
 
As part of the wider statebuilding project clearly responsibilities had to be gradually 
transferred to the new structures of the state and in this sense to the new ministers 
who were of course the rulers of the various states which made up the Federation. 
This in itself brought about a series of problems of co-ordination. On a practical level 
the removal of the rulers to the new capital at al-ittihad brought with it two 
consequences for policing. Firstly, having to split their time between federal and local 
administration meant that neither role received the attention it deserved, and there 
are frequent complaints from British personnel of being unable to get approval from 
ministers. Secondly, the distance created, both physically and mentally, between the 
rulers and the ruled increased. Rulers were spending less time in their territories and 
were less able to direct local police forces, deal personally with disputes and to 
gather intelligence. The new union capital also created a new power base in which 
the rulers were further distracted from events as they squabbled over roles, 
precedence, responsibilities and jurisdictions. Where the limits of federal authority 
lay in relation to the states which made up the union was always a pressing problem, 
which in turn posed problems for policing. This political problem in turn played into 
Britain's problems with the establishment of a nationwide police force.  
 
This situation was made worse by the decision to have both a Minister of the Interior, 
Sharif Husain, and a Minister of Internal Security, Sultan Salih, who both attempted 
to control policing as part of their remit. As Aden was merged with the Federation, 
the already pressing problems facing the Aden Police in terms of understaffing and 
the number of incidents needing police response transmuted themselves into issues 
of command and control, and federal high politics. The Commissioner of Police in 
Aden, Arthur Wiltshire, told John Harding, the Chief Minister's advisor, 'Before 
merger, both the Civil and Armed Police were my operational responsibility, and I 
was directly answerable to the Governor. After merger the Armed Police became a 
Federal Force under Sharif Husain. They're still based in Crater, and are supposed 
to be Aden's first line of defence. However, neither Sharif Husain nor his Civil 
Servants ever come near the place, and I have to go through every sort of 
bureaucratic hoop before I can use them'.43 In addition, since the bulk of the force 
was already recruited from tribes in the Western protectorates, as soon as they 
came under federal control, since 'their strongest affinities are with individual Federal 
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Ministers, many Adenis now regard them as a quasi-military Federal force with a 
mandate to control Aden at their rulers' whim'.44 Thus the transition had both reduced 
the legitimacy of the Aden Armed Police in the eyes of their public while at exactly 
the same time reducing the ability of the Commissioner to use them in a timely and 
effective manner. These issues further emphasise the rushed nature of these 
processes, showing that even in the absence of any Federal Police Force existing 
pieces of the policing mosaic were already degrading in both legitimacy and 
effectiveness.  
 
What made things worse over time was that these tensions between rulers, different 
police forces and the Federal Regular Army continued to further complicate the wider 
problem of where the legitimacy of security ultimately lay. As the legitimacy of the 
rulers diminished, this was further exacerbated by the capricious nature of many 
policy decisions and compounded by Britain's increasing inability to arbitrate 
between the rulers and the different security forces on the ground. London and 
Aden's earlier inability to rationalise the security forces while they still had sufficient 
power and influence had led directly to a situation in which security seemed to be no-
one's responsibility and security forces focused more on internal squabbles than on 
the threats to the state, while also neglecting to provide for the security of the 
population. A classic example of this can be seen in the early 1960s with the position 
of Brigadier James Lunt, Commander of the Federal Regular Army. Having deployed 
troops to reinforce the position at Beihan, command of the operation became 
problematic since 'the Federal National Guard (FNG) units permanently stationed at 
Beihan were controlled by the Emir [and] a keen rivalry existed between the two 
forces that made co-ordinating the two forces difficult'. To make matters worse 'Lunt 
was subordinate to the Arab federal Minister of Defence as commander of the FRA, 
but, as a seconded British officer, he was ultimately answerable to the Commander, 
Middle East Land Forces based in Aden. He received orders from both, which were 
often "contradictory or at least divergent"'.45 The situation was clearly worse than this 
in issues of jurisdiction, command and control when it came to the police, given the 
lack of a Federal Force, the continuing patchwork quilt of forces under different 
commands, and the added rivalry with the army. 
 
Fragmentation of policing responsibilities between the British and the Rulers, and 
between state and federal levels led to extreme opacity and a lack of co-ordination, 
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direction and sense of responsibility, made worse by the replacement of British 
Officers with locals in the run-up to independence. This period was followed by rapid 
consecutive integrations of police forces (and militias with a more martial role) 
leading to numerous power struggles between rulers, officers and tensions within 
newly merged units. This contributed to the general environment of chaos prevalent 
at the time, which in turn created further distance between the police and society. As 
policing rapidly moved towards the creation of the South Arabian Police in 1966, 
nepotism, corruption and abuse of power became ever more prevalent due to the 
wider environment and the lack of control from above. This led to breakdowns in 
discipline, caused in part by people thinking about their own roles, fortunes and 
security post-independence, certain in the knowledge that the police would not be 
able to operate effectively. 
 
While all of this was ongoing, the insurgency itself had gained increased strength 
and the police (of all kinds) increasingly found themselves taking on state security 
functions. In other words they had rapidly become just another army within the 
security arena, unable to bring much in the way of distinctiveness of skills. In short, 
they isolated themselves from the population and were reduced in influence 
accordingly. This of course was a process made much worse by the public's 
plummeting lack of trust and confidence in the Federation, which further fuelled their 
lack of trust in the police. When one also factors in the considerable social change 
which had swept the Arab World, not least Aden and the Protectorates in the 
preceding decades, the job facing the police by the mid-1960s seemed 
insurmountable. With increased urbanisation, growing populations, new ideas, 
increased information flows and internal migration it is unsurprising that rapid and 
complex social change was severely disrupting existing social orders. This was 
clearly, in large part, what undermined the authority of the rulers themselves - hence 
why Abadi highlighted Britain's failure to cultivate a new elite as being an important 
factor in the problems it faced.46 But beyond this, and perhaps more importantly, 
these changes fractured existing social orders based on deference, seniority and 
social values, thereby also undermining systems of self policing so crucial in 
enabling the police to support the maintenance of order. 
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Conclusion - Just Too Late or Just Not Possible? 
 
The story of multiple failures in the realm of policing in South Arabia outlined above 
is a complex mix of unintended consequences, good intentions and changing 
circumstances which made the task of statebuilding even more difficult than usual. It 
is however possible to highlight some of the key factors which severely hampered 
the development of the kind of policing structures needed in South Arabia to give the 
new state a chance of survival. These factors are a mix of those directly associated 
with policing policy, alongside wider factors which mitigated against the chances of a 
successful experiment in statebuilding. 
 
Without doubt for the majority of the period in question, the Aden Police were the 
leading policing body in the whole of South Arabia having been much longer 
established and run along the lines of a relatively modern and efficient force. In this 
sense then they represented the embryo from which a nationwide force may have 
been built, yet at the same time the policing challenges of Aden were vastly different 
to those of the hinterland. The Aden Police were expanded only at a piecemeal rate 
despite the many challenges they faced. It also did not help that the Police in Aden 
were divided between the Aden Civil Police and the Aden Armed Police. With low 
numbers of officers, organisational and bureaucratic problems, and too many 
pressures in the face of strikes, civil unrest and terrorism, they were in no position to 
help build a nation-wide force. The very fact that they were compromised and 
targeted so directly by FLOSY and the NLF demonstrates both of these groups' 
understanding of the importance of police. Clearly, by the time Britain realised the 
need for improved policing it was far too late.  
 
This belated recognition led to a last-minute flurry of activity which, although well 
intentioned, further disrupted the ability of the police to function. There was a shift 
from absolute fragmentation to too much centralisation, and the need for stability and 
continuity in policing was not properly considered.47 Even this final push to establish 
the South Arabian Police lacked the resources needed to make any real difference. 
Ultimately, Britain failed to fully appreciate the importance of policing in general, and 
a national police force in particular, it was unable to shape order effectively and did 
not understand the nature of the security arena in South Arabia. When this interacted 
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with the wider failures in the statebuilding process the chances of the successful 
establishment of a nationwide police force were reduced to nil. 
 
In this sense then, it becomes clear that, in addition to the many obstacles: cultural, 
political and societal, Britain simply left it far too late to focus on policing in South 
Arabia. The mosaic of forces were left underdeveloped for far too long and the move 
towards a nationwide force came far too late in the day to have any impact against 
the tide of the insurgency, and was unable to win round the population to the new 
state when they could already clearly see which way the wind was blowing and had 
nothing to gain and everything to lose from supporting the police. Policing is a 
complex mix of factors and relies on the creation of relationships. These relations 
were often simply not there or were undermined by the rapid changes in direction, 
structure and policy regarding policing, especially during the 1960s. Clearly, we can 
never know what difference a nation-wide police force which benefitted from 
consistent policy, and sufficient material and political support might have achieved in 
shoring up the position of the new Federal State, but what is clear is that the police 
never stood a chance of achieving much because they simply were not given the 
time or the support to establish themselves in the communities of South Arabia. 
 
The sidelining of policing policy as part of the British policymaking and statebuilding 
processes in South Arabia can therefore be seen as an important factor in the failure 
of the FSA, made only more toxic by the other challenges facing the new state and 
British policymakers.48 This article has sought to supplement the archival record by 
integrating ideas from the literature on policing and security which emphasise the 
reasons for the importance of policing more generally for the health and 
development of the state. In doing so, it has added greater depth to the story of the 
failure of Britain's statebuilding project in South Arabia, demonstrating that the extent 
to which the collapse of the Federation and British withdrawal in 1967 was in fact as 
much dependent on the failure to establish the legitimacy and efficiency of the 
organs of state policing, as it was down to the challenges posed by the Aden Trades 
Union Congress, Insurgency and Egyptian intrigue. 
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